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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No. 10189

LEO J. NUTTALL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted of obtaining a chose in action by false pretenses in violation of 76-20-8, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, in the First Judicial District Court, Cache
County, and appeals from the conviction.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried on April 9, 1964, on the crime
charged by jury trial, the Honorable Lewis H. Jones, Judge,
presiding, and was found guilty and judgment was entered
thereon on the 27th day of April, 1964.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following statement of facts.
On or about the 25th day of October, 1962, the appellant, Leo J. Nuttall, approached Richard B. Gittens, a
service station owner in Cache County with whom he had
prior acquaintance ( T. 9) . Nuttall advised Gittens and
other persons who were present that he knew of a means by
which they could make some money without any investment. He would sell Gittens a tractor and Gittens would
lease the tractor back to him and he in turn would lease the
tractor to third persons (T. 11 ) . No money or any investment would have to be made by Gittens, nor would he have
to make a payment (T. 11). After a period of time, Gittens
was lead to believe he could have $300 or a used tractor
(T. 11). Gittens was advised that Nuttall had one tractor
left to use in the transaction (T. 12) . It was understood
that the payments to be made on the tractor would be made
from monies derived by Gittens leasing the tractor back to
Nuttall who in tum would re-lease to other persons. Gittens
was not advised that his contract to purchase the tractor
would be discounted for finance purposes or that a finance
company was to be involved. He was merely advised that
he need not put up any money, but that in three years he
could receive either money or a used tractor (T. 15, 16).
As a consequence of Nuttall's representation, Gittens executed plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. Exhibit 2 is a conditional sales contract whereby Gittens would buy from Leo
J. Nuttall d b a Universal Equipment Company, a used
Ford tractor and blade. Exhibit 1 was an equipment lease
of the same Ford tractor from Gittens back to Universal
Equipment Rentals. The lease was to be for 60 months for
a total of $1650 to be paid at $27.50 per month. Subsequent
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to signing the contract, Gittens heard nothing further.
Thereafter, approximately a year or so later, he received
delinquent notices from Pacific Finance Company of Logan
informing him that payments were due to them under the
contract and lease. The evidence disclosed that Mr. Gene
Bronson, the manager of Pacific Finance Company, was
approached by Mr. Nuttall relative to discounting Mr.
Gittens contract and other contracts which were of the
same order which he had received from other persons (T.
45-48). Mr. Bronson gave him a $550 loan on the contract
and made a check payable to Leo Nuttall of Universal
Equipment Company. The evidence at trial disclosed that
Mr. Nuttall had made generally the same representations
concerning a tractor lease and purchase agreement to various other persons as well as Mr. Gittens. These persons had
also entered into contracts with Mr. Nuttall (Exhibits 516) on generally the same terms and had the same experience. Mr. Nuttall has also discounted these contracts with
Mr. Bronson (T. 55-58, 43-48). Subsequent to Mr. Gittens
being informed that he had to make payments to Pacific
Finance Company, he and several other persons confronted
Mr. Nuttall who, in their presence, admitted that there
were "no tractors" (T. 13, 26, 62). The tractor which was
allegedly sold by Mr. Nuttall to Mr. Gittens bore Serial No.
378432. A tractor with that serial number was present at
trial but various experts testified that the serial number
appeared to be not the original number on the tractor but
had been stamped over after having been ground down
(T. 82, 77, 17). Further no company by the name of Universal Equipment Rentals of Salt Lake City could be located (T. 64). The evidence at trial further disclosed that
Mr. Gittens had not as yet had to pay any money to anyone
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on account of the transaction. Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE
APPELLANT DID IN FACT COMMIT A FRAUD.

The appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient
to prove the crime charged. It is submitted that the evidence is overwhelming to prove each of the elements essential to the crime. It appears that at the time Gittens was
induced to sign the contract of purchase and then tum over
the contract of purchase to the appellant, representations
were made that he would be buying a tractor which the
appellant presently had. The tractor would then be leased
back to the appellant or his company and he would in tum
re-lease to a third person and the income from the latter
lease would pay the contract payments on the tractor purchased. It appears that there was no such company in
existence as Universal Equipment Rentals of Salt Lake City
(T. 64). Further, there never were any tractors, thus the
representation that Leo Nuttall made that he had one tractor left which would be the subject of the sale and resulting
leaseback was a false representation of a present material
fact. As a consequence of the repr~sentations, Gittens was
induced to sign the contract and parted with the contract,
turning it over to Nuttall for the purposes of the transaction. Nuttall in turn used the contract to obtain money from
Pacific Finance Company, a transaction which had not
been contemplated by the parties. Additionally, it should
be noted that Nuttall made the same representation to various other people, going through the same scheme, which
demonstrates that he had a design to obtain money when
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he knew that his representations were false. Further, he
made the same admission, that there were never any tractors, in front of several witnesses. It is clear that these facts
evidence the crime of obtaining a chose in action by false
pretenses. The crime of obtaining chose in action by false
pretenses is merely an extension of the common law crime
of obtaining money or property by false pretenses. Clark
and Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., section 1223. Thus 76-20-8,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, groups the crimes of obtaining
money, goods, wares, chases of action, or chattels, by false
pretenses all under one heading. The same elements are
essential to the crime, only the object is different.
In State v. Howd, 55 U. 527, 188 P. 628 ( 1920), this
court acknowledged that under the provisions of 103-18-8,
Revised Statutes 1933, which is the same statute as presently designated 76-20-8, UCA, 1953, that there must be:
1. An intent to cheat or defraud,
2. An actual fraud committed,
3. A fraudulent representation for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud, and
4. That the fraudulent representation induced the
person to part with his property.
In this instance, the evidence fully discloses that each of
these elements was met. The intent to cheat and defraud
is apparent from the facts themselves, i.e. the absence of any
tractor, the discounting of the contract with the finance
company where such act was not indicated as being contemplated at the time the contract was entered into, and
the numerous instances in which the same scheme was employed. That an actual fraud was committed is apparent
from the fact that Gittens was induced to enter into the
contract and transfer the same to the appellant on the basis
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that there was a present tractor in existence and actually
no tractor was in existence, nor was the program as outlined capable of being performed. There was a fraudulent
representation as to the existence not only of the tractor,
but apparently as to the status of Mr. Nuttall's business
since it does not appear of record that there was any such
business leasing tractors as Mr. Nuttall represented. Finally,
the fraudulent and false representations of the appellant
caused the victim to part with his chose in action. The appellant confuses the fact that Gittens has not sustained any
monetary loss as yet with whether he has in fact sustained
a loss. When he parted with his contract, he parted with
what purported to be a binding legal obligation capable of
rendering him from benefit. A chose in action is merely an
intangible opportunity to have the substance of a chose become a reality. By parting with the chose in action, the
fraud was complete and Gittens had parted with his rights
under the contract and with his expected return. Choses in
action have various values. This is evidenced in this case by
the fact that the contract and leasing agreement were sufficiently valuable that a finance company was willing to pay
$550 for the agreement. Mr. Gittens lost the value of that
chose in action when he gave it over to Mr. Nuttall; and
where the fraud of Nuttall set up and executed the whole
scheme, Gittens lost a valuable expectancy. Further,
whether Gittens may or may not ultimately be called upon
to respond is immaterial to the issues of the case. The crime
charged was not obtaining money by false pretenses, but
was complete when Gittens parted with the contract and
rental agreement.
The doctrine of the H owd case has been followed in various subsequent cases. In State v. Timmerman, 88 U. 481,
55 P.2d 1320 ( 1936), the elements expressed in the Howd
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case were expanded to some extent. Essentially, however,
the requirements of a fraudulent representation knowingly
made with the purpose of defrauding a person and obtaining something of value were still required. Further, it was
recognized that the party must part with something of
value in reliance upon the false and fraudulent representation. There is no question but what the execution of a chose
in action is something of value. It may be valuable to each
party to a chose in action, which is in the form of a contract.
It has a readily identifiable market value. A value, therefore, can be placed on a contract and it is, therefore, obvious
that the victim in this case parted with something of value.
In Balline v. The District Court, 107 U. 247, 152 P.2d
265 ( 1945), this court recognized that fraud by silence may
occur where the circumstances require an honest disclosure
and that fraud may occur when there is a material misrepresentation of a fact which had the victim known of the
truth of the matter, he would not have parted with his
money, property, or chose in action. In that case, this court
affirmed a conviction where the misrepresentation was as
to encumbrances against an automobile and where the circumstances involved a failure to disclose the status of the
title, coupled with such representations as would lead a
person to believe he was receiving a vehicle free of any
impediments to clear title. The facts, although in a different setting, are not unlike those in the present case. This
court found the fraud to be sufficiently proved so as to allow
the conviction to be sustained. See also State v. C-obb, 13
U.2d 376, 374 P.2d 845 ( 1962). The scheme in the Cobb
case bears some resemblance to the scheme in the instant
case although it involved a credit card situation. This court
observed as to the contention that the evidence was insufficient that "We can answer only that there appears to have
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been too much to convict." As a consequence, there is no
merit to the appellant's position that a fraud was not shown.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING OTHER
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY CONCERNING SIMILAR DEALINGS WITH THE APPELLANT.

During the course of the trial, after the victim identified
in the information, Mr. Richard Gittens, had testified, the
court allowed other witnesses who had been the victims of
the same scheme to testify. Mr. Gittens was the first witness
and testified as to the execution of Exhibits 1 and 2, the representation made that a tractor was in existence, and as to
the contemplated course of dealing between Mr. Gittens
and the appellant. He further testified as to receiving notices from the finance company as to the necessity of making
contract payments where at the time of the agreement it
was not contemplated that the parties would be involved
with a finance company. Further, Mr. Gittens testified that
as to the tractor which was present at the time of trial that
the serial number which it had did not appear to be its true
serial number. All of this evidence was sufficient to show a
probability that a crime had been committed. Further, the
appellant's admission that there had never been any tractors was received in evidence through Mr. Gittens (T. 13).
The appellant argues that there was not sufficient corpus
delicti to prove the crime; therefore, it was improper to
allow other witnesses to testify as to similar dealings. The
appellant's argument is a non sequitur. The two concepts
(corpus delicti and proof of other crimes) are not related
and the appellant has confused legal propositions which are
independent of each other. The rule as to corpus delicti is
that a confession in and of itself will not support a convic-
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tion but it must be corroborated by other facts which show
a probability that the crime charged has in fact been committed. In the absence of a corpus delicti, a confession may
not be received. Further, in the absence of a corpus delicti,
a crime has not been proved. However, the corpus delicti
need not prove the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, but need only show some evidence that a crime
in fact had been committed. In the instant case, no confession as such was received into evidence. As a consequence,
the corpus delicti rule is not strictiy raised.
In State v. Ferry, 2 U.2d 371, 275 P.2d 173 ( 1954), it
was stated:
"In State v. Wells, 1909, 35 Utah 400, 100 P. 681,
136 Am. St. Rep. 1059, 19 Ann. Cas. 631, we held the
independent evidence must prove the corpus delicti
beyond a reasonable doubt; in State v. Johnson, 1938,
95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010, we softened that rule by
saying such proof need not be conclusive; we ennunciate the rule in our present decision, to clarify the matter, feeling that such rule, already announced in Arizona in Burrows v. State, 8 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029, is the
soundest of those heretofore enunciated by the authorities. See also, State v. Crank, 1943" 105 Utah 332"
142 P. 2d 178, 170 A.L.R. 542.'"
The rule now in effect in this state is that the corroboration for corpus delicti need only be "independent, clear and
convincing." State v. Ferry, supra; State v. Weldon, 6 U.2d
372,314P.2d353 (1957).
It is submitted that the evidence in the instant case, even
apart from the admission of the appellant, is sufficient to
show a probability that a crime was committed. Evidence
of the false representations of the appellant, or at least the
failure to disclose matters which at the time of contracting
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would definitely mislead the victim, is evidenced by the fact
that there was no Universal Equipment Rentals of Salt
Lake City (T. 64). This, coupled with the presence of a
finance company when none was contemplated and the
failure of the agreement to assume the form which the parties contemplated, was sufficient evidence to be added to the
other evidence so as to prove the guilt of the appellant.
Further, the employment of the same scheme in other instances evidence the fraud and leads to the inference of a
wrongful scheme. Therefore, it is apparent that the concept of corpus delicti offers the appellant no basis for reversal. However, it does not appear that concept of corpus
delicti is tied in with the concept of showing a scheme or
design to defraud. Indeed, the evidence of other contracts
under similar circumstances and the defalcations of those
contracts tends to support a conclusion that the contractual
situation which was the subject of the information was
merely a part of a scheme. Thus, in State v. Tacconi, 110
U. 212, 171 P.2d 388 ( 1946), this court recognized that it is
permissible to show other acts of an accused which may evidence guilty knowledge or show a scheme or design to perpetrate a crime. McCormick Evidence ( 1954), page 328,
notes that evidence of other crimes may be introduced "to
prove the evidence of a larger continuing plan, scheme or
conspiracy of which the present crime on trial is a part."
It is, therefore, perfectly permissible to allow the other witnesses to testify to demonstrate the full scheme or plan that
was involved. See State v. Nemier, 106 U. 307, 148 P.2d
327 ( 1944) ; State v. Scott, 111 U. 9, 175 P.2d 1016 ( 1947).
In the Scott case, this court approved receipt into evidence
of other crimes of the accused tending to show a connection
with the confidence game. This court felt it was relevant to
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show the full scheme and design and thus the criminality of
the accused's involvement. See State v. Lyman, 10 U.2d 58,
348 P.2d 340 ( 1960). There was, therefore, no impropriety
on the part of the trial court in allowing the other witnesses
to testify since the evidence was not relevant simply for the
purpose of demonstrating the appellant's proclivity towards
crime, but rather was directly related to the scheme and
design involved in the commission of the instant crime and
could form a part of the corpus delicti which would justify
the receipt of any confession of the accused, and in this case
the admission of the accused.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF THE STATUS OF OTHER CONTRACTS WHICH WERE A PART OF THE APPELLANT'S
SCHEME.

As can be seen from Point II, the trial court was perfectly
justified in receiving the testimony of similar fraudulent
actions by the appellant in obtaining contracts from other
persons. This evidence tended to show the criminal purpose, scheme and design of the appellant's operation and as
noted before was admissible and probative of the criminality charged under the information. Equally relevant
was the status of the contracts. Whether payments were
made or were not made would directly relate to whether
there were tractors in existence which were being released
by the appellant to provide income to pay off the contracts.
The delinquency in the contracts would tend to support a
conclusion that there was no leasing being carried on and
thus that there were no tractors in existence. The trial court.,
therefore, acted properly in receiving such evidence.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.

The trial court instructed the jury orally on the elements
of the crime and the law applicable to the case (T. 83). The
Instructions covered the various elements and definitions of
terms. The appellant contends that at one point in the
court's instructions the Judge, in effect, commented on the
evidence and thereby committed prejudicial error. The
part which the appellant contends prejudiced him relates
to the court's discussion on the requirement of an intent to
defraud (T. 85). What the court stated which is deemed
prejudicial is as follows :

"* * * There must be an affirmative finding of a
separate evil intent to defraud at the time the signature
of Mr. Gittens was obtained on those papers. Now
there are enough facts and circumstances here, if you
accept the inferences and the theory of the state, to
sustain that. But if you don't accept the inferences and
all of the elements which counsel will discuss, then of
course the state has failed to prove its case."
Thereafter the trial court again reminded the jury of the
rule of reasonable doubt and referred to his previous instructions on the issue. Subsequently, the court instructed
on its intent, this time without commenting as to whether
the facts were or were not sufficient. The court stated (T.
86) :

"We're talking about this intent. This jury must
look into the mind of this defendant and resolve that
question of whether he had this evil intent to ~ilk
Gittens by either not buying the tractor or not mak1ng
the payments at the time the contract was signed."
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Finally, the jury was admonished again on the necessity of
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, was advised that
they were at liberty to believe whom and what they would.
The objectionable portion of the trial court's instruction
may at first blush seem like a comment on the evidence.
However, it is submitted that it in fact when read in the
context with other instructions was no more than an inept
means of setting out the alternative choices for the jury. It
is recognized that in State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P.2d 177 .
this court reversed a conviction where the trial court commented during its instructions on the sufficiency of the evidence. In that case, however, the comment was to the effect
that the evidence was "uncontroverted" and thus left the
jury no room within which to exercise their right to accept
or reject the evidence. In the instant case, the instructions
must be viewed as a whole and when so viewed, it is apparent that the court's comment was no more than an innocuous reference cured by the overall tenor of the instructions. The trial court instructed the jury that they were the
sole judges of the evidence, instructed them on the necessity
of finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, all subsequent
to the offensive instruction, and again instructed the jury on
the intent and did not use the same offensive language. It
is submitted, therefore, that the facts of the insant case are
not as aggravated as those in State v. Green, but rather fit
in the category of remarks found to be nonprejudicial in
State v. Kallas, 97 U. 492, 94 P.2d 414 and State v. Musser,
110 U. 534, 175 P.2d 724. In the case of State v. Dixson,
260 P. 138 (Mont. 1927), the defendant was convicted of
the crime of first degree murder. The trial court in th~
presence of the jury stated, "I think there is evidence sufficient to show that a crime has been committed." The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court's
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statement was improper, but found that it was nonprejudicial in view of the curative instructions and other instructions of a nature that when the alleged offensive instruction
is read in context with all of the instructions given, no prejudice could result. In 24A, C.J.S. Criminal Law, Section
1901, it is observed:

"An appellate court should be slow to reverse for
misconduct of the trial court, unless it appears that the
conduct complained of was intended or calculated to
disparage accused in the eyes of the jury and to prevent the jury from exercising an impartial judgment
on the merits; and misconduct of a trial judge which
will warrant a reversal should be so definite and apparent as to leave little doubt that it resulted in depriving accused of a fair and impartial trial. Improper
remarks of the trial judge, or his misconduct during
the course of the trial, will not be ground for reversal
where no prejudice resulted therefrom.
"The test of prejudicial error, in this connection, is
whether such a fixed impression was made on the
minds of the jury as to influence the verdict and
whether any admonition by the court had the effect
of removing the harmful impression already made;
and a conviction should not be reversed because of the
action of the trial court unless the reviewing court can
say, after review of the whole record, that the action
of the trial court resulted in a miscarriage of justice
and was so grossly improper that it denied accused a
fair trial.***"
This rule has in effect been codified by the Legislature in
77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, providing that the
prejudicial error will not be presumed and that this court
should not reverse a judgment unless it is satisfied that the
substantial rights of a party have been affected. See also,
State v. St. Clair, 5 U.2d 342,301 P.2d 752; State v. Lanoss,
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63 U. 151, 223 P. 1065. It is submitted that in the instant
case the posture of the evidence, the nature of the instructions and the relative insignificance of the alleged prejudicial remark are such that no prejudice could have resulted
to the appellant.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the evidence in the instant case clearly
shows that it was sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. He was afforded a full and fair
trial by a jury who, after viewing the evidence, found the
accused guilty. The alleged claims of prejudicial error
afford no basis for relief and this court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted .

A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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